- VC v. VCG: Inapproximability of Combinatorial Auctions via Generalizations of the VC Dimension by Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer
- Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mechanisms by Dave Buchfuhrer, Chris Umans
- Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms by Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg
- Incentive Compatible Budget Elicitation in Multi-unit Auctions by Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munagala, Lirong Xia
- Differentially Private Approximation Algorithms by Anupam Gupta, Katrina Ligett, Frank McSherry, Aaron Roth, Kunal Talwar
- Classified Stable Matching by Chien-Chung Huang
- Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions by Brendan Lucier and Allan Borodin
- On the Equilibria of Asynchronous Games by Aaron Roth, Nina Balcan, Adam Kalai, Yishay Mansour (Aaron’s blog post)
- A deterministic truthful PTAS for scheduling related machines by George Christodoulou, Annamaria Kovacs
- Pricing Randomized Allocations by Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
- Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization by Fabrizio Grandoni, Piotr Krysta, Stefano Leonardi, Carmine Ventre (talk abstract by Carmine)
- Monotonicity in Bargaining Networks by Yossi Azar, Nikhil Devanur, Kamal Jain, Yuval Rabani
I will give an invited talk there too.
It is especially satisfying that most of these papers are already available on the arXiv!