A conference that attempts to draw lessons from the FCC incentive spectrum auction will be held on Friday May 12th, 2017 in Washington DC.
More information here.
From the award committee:
The SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award recognizes an outstanding dissertation in the fields of electronic commerce and economics and computation. The award is conferred annually at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation and includes a plaque, complimentary conference registration, and an honorarium of $1,500. A plaque may further be given to up to two runners-up. No award may be conferred if the nominations are judged not to meet the standards for the award.
To be eligible, a dissertation must be on a topic related to the fields of electronic commerce or economics and computation and must have been defended successfully during the calendar year preceding the year of the award presentation.
The next SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award will be given for dissertations defended in 2016. Nominations are due by April 14, 2017 (extended deadline), and must be submitted by email with the subject “SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award” to the awards committee at firstname.lastname@example.org. A dissertation may be nominated simultaneously for both the SIGecomDoctoral Dissertation Award and the ACM Doctoral Dissertation Award.
Nominations may be made by any member of SIGecom, and will typically come from the dissertation supervisor. Self-nomination is not allowed. Nominations for the award must include the following, preferably in a single PDF file:
The additional endorsement letters themselves should be emailed directly to email@example.com, by the same deadline. These endorsements should be no longer than 500 words, and should specify the relationship of the endorser to the nominee, contributions of the dissertation, and its potential impact on the field.
It is expected that a nominated candidate, if selected for the award, will attend the next ACM Conference on Economics and Computation to accept the award and give a presentation on the dissertation work. The cost of attending the conference is not covered by the award, but complimentary registration is provided.
Graduate students Rediet Abebe (Cornell) and Kira Goldner (UW) are organizing a workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) at EC 2017, after having run a highly successful multi-institutional reading group on the subject during the Fall 2016 semester. The call for papers follows.
The 1st Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good will be taking place at this year’s ACM Conference on Economics and Computation at MIT on June 26, 2017. The goal of this workshop is to understand domains where tools from mechanism design have the potential to impact social good. During this year’s workshop we will focus on mechanisms that improve access to opportunity. We aim to highlight domains that have been relatively unexplored by the EconCS community. We invite paper submissions broadly related to these themes, including theoretical and applied mechanism design work as well as empirical research that suggests future directions for mechanism design in these domains.
Topics of interest for this workshop include but are not limited to:
allocating low-income housing
allocating health insurance funds, managing access to healthcare, and pricing medical treatments
work on health insurance markets that highlights market design issues
redistributive mechanisms to mitigate economic inequality
understanding and increasing intergenerational mobility
mitigating unequal economic outcomes in online labor markets
detecting existence or causes of exploitative market behavior in online labor markets
evaluating students, teachers, or schools
design of transportation systems to reverse trends impacting inequality
Submissions will be evaluated on the following criteria:
Relevance to this workshop and its theme.
Novelty of domain.
Potential for follow-up work in the EC community: those from other communities who feel they fit this criterion are especially encouraged to submit.
Authors may submit papers that are already under review or accepted in conferences or journals. There will be no published proceedings.
Authors will be asked to submit up to 250 words on EasyChair summarizing their results and relevance to the workshop. In addition, submissions will be accepted as a PDF and may be either working papers or papers that have been published at an established conference or journal. We do not require submissions to be in the EC format. If published, please include citation as to where it was published on the first page. The committee reserves the right not to review all the technical details of submissions.
Submission Deadline: April 27, 2017
Submission page: EasyChair
Notification: May 18, 2017
Workshop Date: June 26, 2017
Rediet Abebe, Cornell University
Kira Goldner, University of Washington
The deadlines for the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC 2017) are approaching:
For submission instructions please see http://www.sigecom.org/ec17/papers.html
SPECIAL NOTE ON STOC’17 submissions: “If you have a STOC’17 submission and plan to send the paper to ACM EC’17 if rejected from STOC, please register the paper by February 6th as any other submission, and in case the paper is accepted to STOC, delete the EC’17 submission when notified by STOC.”
From the back cover:
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author’s Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
I’m sure that Noam is too modest to mention the great news on his own blog, so I’ll have to do it: Noam was just awarded the Knuth Prize for his many fundamental contributions to computational complexity, pseudorandomness, and algorithmic game theory. The Knuth Prize is awarded for “outstanding contributions to the foundations of computer science by individuals for their overall impact in the field over an extended period.”