On behalf of the organizers:

The Workshop on Economic Aspects of Cloud Computing
(with the Conference on Economics and Computation)
July 24, 2016, Maastricht, the Netherlands

From the CFP: “The digitization of the world’s businesses, and the movement of this digitization into the cloud is akin to an industrial revolution. Cloud computing will be to businesses what mobile computing has been to consumers. This raises a whole slew of questions in economics, most of which are deeply entangled with computer science topics. The focus of this workshop is on the economic aspects of cloud computing. The goal of the workshop is to be the premier platform to raise the most important research questions, to announce the latest results, to exchange ideas, to learn and to get feedback on the state of the art research in this area. The topics of interest for this workshop include but not limited to the following.

  • Moving to the cloud: How are current businesses impacted by moving to a cloud enabled world?
  • New Markets: What new markets emerge? What new economic models are enabled?
  • Cloud Pricing: What are the different pricing or auction mechanisms to sell cloud computing resources, and the pros and cons of each?
  • Cloud provisioning: The economies of scale in provisioning and running large data centers.
  • Fair Allocation: How to allocate cloud resources in a fair manner in a shared multi-tenant system?”

The workshop is organized by Nikhil Devanur, Eric Friedman, Preston McAfee, Noam Nisan, Eva Tardos, and Adam Wierman.  All submissions should be submitted through the EasyChair no later than May 17, 2016.

On behalf of the organizers:

The Second Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science
(with the Conference on Economics and Computation)
July 24, 2016, Maastricht, the Netherlands

From the CFP: “Computer systems have become the primary mediator of social and economic interactions, enabling transactions at ever-increasing scale. Mechanism design when done on a large scale needs to be a data-driven enterprise. It seeks to optimize some objective with respect to a huge underlying population that the mechanism designer does not have direct access to. Instead, the mechanism designer typically will have access to sampled behavior from that population (e.g. bid histories, or purchase decisions). This means that, on the one hand, mechanism designers will need to bring to bear data-driven methodology from statistical learning theory, econometrics, and revealed preference theory. On the other hand, strategic settings pose new challenges in data science, and approaches for learning and inference need to be adapted to account for strategization. The goal of this workshop is to frame the agenda for research at the interface of algorithms, game theory, and data science.”

The workshop is organized by Richard Cole (NYU), Brad Larsen (Stanford U), Kevin Leyton-Brown (UBC), Balasubramanian Sivan (Google Research), and Vasilis Syrgkanis (Microsoft Research).  All submissions should be sent electronically to AGTDataScienceWorkshop16@gmail.com on or before May 20, 2016.

We are delighted to announce that the Handbook of Computational Social Choice has now been published with Cambridge University Press.

handbook_cscDescription: The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field’s major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

A PDF of the book is freely available on the Cambridge University Press website. Click on the Resources tab, then on “Resources” under “General Resources”, and you will find a link called “Online Version”. The password is cam1CSC.

Alternatively, the book can be purchased through Cambridge University Press, Amazon, and other retailers.

We hope that the book will become a valuable resource for the computational social choice community, and the CS-econ community at large.

Best regards,
Felix Brandt, Vince Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang, and Ariel Procaccia (the editors)

Continuing the tradition from last year, there will be an article in the June edition of the SIGecom Exchanges profiling 2017 junior job market candidates from the SIGecom community. These profiles will include the thesis title, research summary, brief biography, and citations to three representative papers. At least one of these papers should have appeared in the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) or a comparable venue. To be considered, submissions must be initiated by May 15 and finalized by May 22. Further instructions for submissions can be found on the submission form. The article will be coedited by Hu Fu and Vasilis Gkatzelis.

The 11th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2016) will be held on June 14, 2016, in conjunction with ACM SIGMETRICS 2016, in Juan-les-Pins, France. Deadline for paper submission is Friday April 1, 2016. The CFP can be found here.

The 25rd International World Wide Web Conference (WWW 2016) will be held from April 11 to 15, 2016 in Montreal.  Among its many tracks is the Economics and Markets Track.  Deadline for paper submission is October 17th (abstract due by October 10th).

The first of a series of special issues from STOC, FOCS, and SODA has been published in Games and Economic Behavior; it contains papers invited from the 2011 conferences. The papers in the issue cover topics including mechanism design, the price of anarchy, networks, and learning in games. As the introduction to the special issue [pdf] concludes, “2011 was an outstanding year for algorithmic game theory.”

A very big thank you to guest editors Shuchi Chawla and Lisa Fleischer!