Lecture videos and notes from the first four weeks of my AGT course at Stanford have been posted. Week 2 characterizes dominant-strategy mechanisms in single-parameter environments (Myerson’s Lemma, the Revelation Principle) and gives an introduction to algorithmic mechanism design (e.g., Knapsack auctions). Week 3 covers the basic theory of Bayesian optimal mechanisms, and more recent results about simple near-optimal and prior-independent auctions. Week 4 is about multi-parameter mechanism design, including the VCG mechanism and combinatorial auctions, and also includes case studies on reserve prices in Yahoo! keyword auctions and on the past, present, and future of wireless spectrum auctions.
Looking ahead, Week 5 is about mechanism design with payment constraints (budgets or no money at all), with a case study on kidney exchange, and Week 6 covers the price of anarchy of selfish routing.